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Abstract—Wrist-wearables such as smartwatches and fitness
bands are equipped with a variety of high-precision sensors that
support novel contextual and activity-based applications. The
presence of a diverse set of on-board sensors, however, also expose
an additional attack surface which, if not adequately protected,
could be potentially exploited to leak private user information. In
this work, we investigate the feasibility of a new attack that takes
advantage of a wrist-wearable’s motion sensors to infer input on
mechanical devices typically used to secure physical access, for
example, combination locks. We outline an inference framework
that attempts to infer a lock’s unlock combination from the wrist
motion captured by a smartwatch’s gyroscope sensor, and uses
a probabilistic model to produce a ranked list of likely unlock
combinations. We conduct a thorough empirical evaluation of
the proposed framework by employing unlocking-related motion
data collected from human subject participants in a variety of
controlled and realistic settings. Evaluation results from these
experiments demonstrate that motion data from wrist-wearables
can be effectively employed as a side-channel to significantly
reduce the unlock combination search-space of commonly found
combination locks, thus compromising the physical security
provided by these locks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wrist-wearables such as smartwatches and fitness bands
are gaining popularity among mobile users, and will continue
to be a prevalent mobile technology in the future [3]. The
presence of a diverse set of sensors on-board these devices,
however, expose an additional attack surface which, if not
adequately protected, could be potentially exploited to leak
private user information. Weak or absent access control and
security policies vis-a´-vis some of these sensors have further
compounded this problem. The research literature is rife with
proposals that demonstrate how data from wrist-wearable
sensors can be abused to infer private user information, such
as, keystrokes, activities and behavior [32], [48], [30], [31],
[47], [43], [51], [50], [26]. The continuous placement of wrist-
wearables on users’ body, coupled with their unique design and
usage, also puts them at a significantly higher risk of being
targeted for such privacy threats.
Our focus is on threats that enable an adversary to infer
private inputs or interactions made by a target user on an
input-interface (of some system of interest to the adversary)
by taking advantage of zero-permission sensor data available
from the user’s wrist-wearable. Zero-permission sensors (i.e.,
This paper was revised on September 26, 2018. Please refer to the Appendix
for details on corrections made.
sensors that are not regulated by explicit user or system-
defined access permissions) provide a relatively unobstructed
attack surface to the adversary. A majority of research con-
tributions in this direction have primarily focused on threats
that attempt to infer private user inputs on interfaces of
purely cyber or cyber-physical systems, for example, inference
of keystrokes or taps on physical keyboards or touchscreen
keypads [32], [48], [30], [31], [47], [24]. We focus on a
slightly different kind of threat in this work which is to
investigate the feasibility of inferring a target user’s private
inputs or interactions on the interface of a purely mechanical
device by harnessing the sensor data available from the user’s
wrist-wearable. We specifically focus on inferring inputs on
mechanical devices typically used to secure physical access
(on doors and lockers), for example, combination locks. Such
privacy threats concerning mechanical safety devices, which
may now be feasible due to the upcoming wearable device
technology, has the potential of impacting the physical safety
and security of users.
Our specific research goal in this work is to investigate the
feasibility of inferring unlock combinations of commercially-
available mechanical combination locks and safes (Figure
1) by exploiting inertial or motion sensor data from wrist-
wearables such as smartwatches. During the unlocking pro-
cess of combination locks, the wrist on the unlocking hand
undergoes perceptible and unique movements and rotations
of its own, which is strongly correlated with the unlock
combination. Our hypothesis is that, if these motions can be
accurately captured and characterized, then it can be used to
infer the lock’s combination. Our objective is to validate the
above hypothesis by empirically evaluating the accuracy and
effort with which such an inference attack can be executed
using wrist-wearables. In line with this objective, we make
the following technical contributions:
1) A novel motion-based combination key inference frame-
work comprising of: (i) an activity recognition component
for efficiently and accurately identifying unlocking-related
data in the continuous motion data stream, (ii) a segmenta-
tion component to separate and appropriately characterize
motion data corresponding to each part of the multi-part
combination or key, and (iii) an attack component that
maps the characterizations of the individual parts obtained
from the previous steps to a (or a set of) valid combination
key(s).
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22) A comprehensive empirical evaluation of the proposed
attack framework in order to assess its performance: (i) on
a commercially available padlock and safe, (ii) by using
different key spaces, (iii) in a cross-device setting, (iv) in
a cross-hand setting, and (iv) under real-life lock operation
scenarios.
II. RELATED WORK
Threats that attempt to infer private information, user-
contexts or user-activities by capturing related electromag-
netic, acoustic, optical and/or mechanical emanations from
a target device or user and employing them as information
side-channels have been well-studied in the literature [40],
[27], [4], [6], [11], [9], [7], [46], [8], [21], [5], [49], [28].
With the advent of smartphones, researchers started focusing
on employing the phone’s on-board hardware and software
sensors to investigate the feasibility of similar inference attacks
[45]. One notable sensor modality that now became available
as an attack vector is the smartphone’s inertial or motion
sensors, such as, accelerometers and gyroscopes, which are
capable of capturing fine-grained linear and angular motion of
the user or object on which the phone was placed. Smartphone
inertial sensors have been exploited to infer keystrokes on the
phone itself as well as external keyboards [10], [33], [14], [52],
[39], to track user movements and locations [20], [22], [37], to
infer private user activities [38] and to decode human speech
[34]. Similarly, smartphone microphone and/or magnetometer
have also been exploited to infer private user information [42]
or trade secrets (such as 3D-printer designs) [23], [44], [18],
private user activities [41] and natural handwriting [54]. Re-
cently, aggregate power usage over a period of time available
from the smartphone’s power meter was used to track user
movements and locations [35].
The arrival of smartwatches and fitness bands have fueled
a similar line of research in the area of private user-input,
activity and context inference threats that take advantage of
data available from sensors on-board these commercial wrist-
wearable devices. However, unlike smartphones, as smart
wearables are always carried by users on their body in the
same natural position, the resulting continuous nature of sensor
data available from them is more vulnerable to misuse and
related inference threats more likely to succeed. Smartwatch
motion sensors, similar to the smartphone case, have been
exploited to infer keystrokes [32], [48], [30], [31], [47],
user-activities [43], [29], handwriting [51], [50] and driving
behavior [26]. Recently, ambient light sensors on these devices
have also been used to infer private keystroke information [24].
Given this plethora of research results, it is clear that sensors
on-board mobile and wearable devices pose a significant
privacy threat. It is alarming though that common mobile and
wearable device users are unaware of such threats [16].
In this work, we investigate the feasibility of a new kind
of privacy threat, i.e., inferring unlock combinations of me-
chanical locks using wrist-wearable motion sensors, which has
never been investigated before. Several modern smart locks
offer a numeric keypad which can be compromised using
known smartwatch-based keystroke inference techniques in the
literature [32], [48], [30], [31], [47]. However, in this work we
target traditional rotation-based mechanical locks which are
still very popular and where existing attack techniques will not
work. Blaze [13], [12] systematically examined physical and
design weaknesses in both combination and pin-tumbler locks.
However, our primary contribution in this work is to show
how external side-channel attacks can make even a securely
designed lock vulnerable.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider the scenario of a target user who is wearing
a wrist-wearable such as a smartwatch and is entering the
unlock combination or key on the circular dial of a mechanical
combination lock (targeted by the adversary) with the watch-
wearing hand. The goal of the adversary is to infer the
unlocking combination of the lock by employing the inertial
or motion sensor data available from the smartwatch worn by
the target user. We assume that the adversary has knowledge
of the exact type (make and model) of the target combination
lock and that the dial of the lock has sufficient resistance to
prevent rotation by mere movement of fingers. The adversary
is able to record and obtain the inertial or motion sensor
data from the target smartwatch through several different
modalities. One way an adversary can achieve this is by
creating a trojan app and then tricking the unsuspecting target
user or victim into downloading and installing this trojan
onto their wearable device. In case the adversary is a popular
service provider, gaining access in such a fashion is much
more straightforward as unsuspecting users may download
and install the malicious app on their own volition. This
malicious eavesdropping app samples the on-device sensors
of interest (specifically, the gyroscope sensor data is used for
this particular attack) and transfers the sampled sensor data
to a remote server controlled by the adversary through some
covert communication channel, say by hiding it within useful
communications. We assume that the malicious app has the
required permissions to access these sensors of interest. As the
proposed attack employs the gyroscope sensor, which is a zero-
permission sensor on popular wearable operating systems such
as Android Wear and watchOS, the adversary has a relatively
unobstructed attack path once the malicious app is installed
on the device. We also assume that the adversary maintains
a remote server with sufficient storage and computational
resources to archive the eavesdropped data and to perform
offline inference computations. The above adversary model
is practically feasible and has been a standard assumption
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: Targeted combination locks: (a) Master Lock 1500T
padlock, (b) First Alert 2087F-BD safe.
3for similar lines of investigations. In addition to the above
cyber resources, the adversary also has a limited amount of
physical access to the target lock (in order to conduct the
actual physical attack on the lock by trying out the inferred
combination), but not long enough to manually brute-force the
lock’s combination. The adversary presets/notes the position
of the (lock’s) dial before the target user begins the unlocking
operation. However, the adversary has no visual access to the
dial during the unlocking operation itself.
IV. BACKGROUND
A. Mechanical Combination Locks
After studying the technical specifications of several com-
mercially available mechanical combination locks, we decided
to focus on two specific types of locks whose internal me-
chanical structure and physical operation are representative
and commonly found in most rotary combination locks: (i)
padlocks, and (ii) consumer-grade safes. For the padlock we
chose a Master Lock 1500T model lock (Figure 1a), while for
the safe we chose a First Alert 2087F-BD safe (Figure 1b).
The front dial of the Master Lock 1500T is used to enter
the unlock combination key and has 40 numbers on its face.
As the combination key comprises of three numbers (each
taking a value between 0 and 39) which must be entered
sequentially, the resulting theoretical combination key space
is 403 = 64, 000. In order to unlock the Master Lock 1500T,
a user must turn the dial clockwise two full rotations and stop
at the first number of the combination key on the third turn
(phase 1), then turn it counter-clockwise past the first number
of the combination key to the second number of the key (phase
2), and finally turn the dial clockwise to the third number
of the combination key (phase 3). Let traversing from one
number to it’s sequential number (in any direction) be called
a “unit” of traversal. Then it should be noted that, depending
on the combination key being entered, in phase 1 the user
traverses anywhere between 81 and 120 units in the clockwise
direction, in phase 2 he traverses anywhere between 41 and
80 units in the counter-clockwise direction, and in phase 3 he
traverses anywhere between 1 and 40 units in the clockwise
direction. If this procedure is correctly followed, and if the
entered combination key is correct, the indentations on the
lock’s cams align correctly allowing the hasp to be released
and opening the lock.
The First Alert 2087F-BD safe’s lock dial comprises of
100 numbers (from 0 to 99) on its face. It’s combination key
comprises of four numbers (each taking a value between 0
and 99) which must be entered sequentially, thus resulting in
a theoretical combination key space of 1004. In order to unlock
the safe, a user must turn the dial counter-clockwise four full
rotations and stop at the first number of the combination key
on the fifth turn (phase 1), then turn it clockwise twice past
the first number to the second number (phase 2), then turn it
counter-clockwise past the second number to stop at the third
number (phase 3), and finally turn the dial clockwise to the
fourth number (phase 4). Depending on the combination key
being entered, in phase 1 the user traverses anywhere between
401 and 500 units in the counter-clockwise direction, in phase
2 he traverses anywhere between 201 and 300 units in the
clockwise direction, in phase 3 he traverses anywhere between
101 and 200 units in the counter-clockwise direction, and in
phase 4 he traverses anywhere between 1 and 100 units in the
clockwise direction. Similar to the Master Lock 1500T, if this
procedure is correctly followed and if the entered combination
key is correct, the safe opens.
B. Combination Key and Wrist Movements
Before designing an inference framework, we need to
develop a clear understanding of how the activity of enter-
ing a combination key on a lock’s dial impacts the wrist
movement of the unlocking hand, and if it is possible to
accurately and consistently characterize this movement using
the motion sensor data obtained from modern wrist wearables
such as smartwatches. More concretely, we would like to first
understand the relationship between the amount of movement
of a lock’s dial and the corresponding amount of movement
of the user’s wrist. We quantify the amount of movement of
a lock’s dial using the parameter transition, which measures
the number of units traversed when inputing a particular
number of the combination. As the unlock combination key
of the Master Lock 1500T padlock has three numbers (and
correspondingly, the unlocking procedure has three phases),
the amount of movement of the lock’s dial during the un-
locking process can be completely characterized by three
transitions. Similarly, as the First Alert 2087F-BD safe has
a four number combination, the amount of movement of the
lock’s dial during unlocking can be completely characterized
by four transitions. We quantify the amount of movement
(or rotation) of a user’s wrist by computing the angular
displacement from the observed smartwatch gyroscope data.
As the gyroscope measures angular velocity, the corresponding
angular displacements can be calculated by integrating the
obtained angular velocity readings.
In order to quantify the relationship between transitions on
a lock’s dial and the wrist’s angular displacements, we con-
duct some preliminary unlocking experiments on the Master
Lock 1500T padlock. Specifically, we collected smartwatch
gyroscope samples at a sampling rate of 200 Hz from three
human subjects who unlocked the padlock wearing a Samsung
Gear Live. The subjects in our preliminary experiments entered
40 different combinations on the Master Lock 1500T padlock
which covered all the 120 possible transitions (40 possible
transitions per number in any combination key). While en-
tering each combination, the subjects always started from
a known position (number 0)1 and entered the combination
by correctly following the unlocking procedure described in
Section IV-A. For each subject, we plot the angular displace-
ment (in radians), calculated by integrating the corresponding
angular velocities observed on the x-axis of the smartwatch’s
gyroscope, for each each transition in either direction (Figure
2a).
1The starting point can be any number on the dial. However, the key
inference function (Equations 1 and 2) must be initialized accordingly, during
the inference phase.
4From Figure 2 we first observe that, for each transition
(irrespective of the direction of rotation), the angular dis-
placement of the wrist calculated from the raw smartwatch
gyroscope data is not the same as the angular displacement of
the lock’s dial. These inaccuracies could be attributed to the
discrete nature of the gyroscope readings, which are limited
by the maximum sampling rate of the gyroscope hardware. In
addition to this, the cartilaginous joints between the fingers and
the wrist, do not allow for a perfect rotation of the wrist during
the unlocking operation. As a result, an adversary cannot
simply use the angular displacement of the wrist calculated
from the raw smartwatch gyroscope data to determine the
angular displacement, and thus the corresponding transition,
on the lock’s dial. Our second observation is that the angular
displacement of the wrist calculated from the raw smartwatch
gyroscope data can be approximated as an increasing lin-
ear function of the transitions on the lock’s dial. Although
intuitive, the interesting and encouraging aspect here is that
this relationship is consistent for all three subjects. Lastly, we
observe that this linear relationship is reasonably homologous
or similar across different subjects. We only used the x-axis
of the gyroscope data for these plots because we observed
that the x-axis remains perpendicular to the lock (Figure 1a)
during the unlocking operation and provides a more accurate
measure of angular displacement than the other two axes.
So, what do these observations mean to an adversary who
wants to infer the combination key entered by some target
user? The adversary is unable to accurately determine the
angular displacement or transition on the lock’s dial (and
thus the corresponding number in the combination) directly
from the corresponding angular displacement of the wrist
computed using the smartwatch’s gyroscope data. However,
an adversary could use the above observations to construct
a learning-based inference framework that translates angular
displacements of the wrist (computed from the smartwatch’s
gyroscope data) to transitions on the lock’s dial, and train this
framework using some representative training data. The adver-
sary could then employ such a trained inference framework to
infer the combination (entered by the target user) from the
smartwatch gyroscope data. We develop such an inference
framework in Sections V and VI. However, there are two
additional challenges that we need to overcome. First, in a
long sequence of time-series gyroscope data, how does the
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Fig. 2: (a) – Positive (blues) and negative (greens) angular
displacements, collected from three subjects; (b) Combined
linear least squares fitting.
adversary identify data corresponding to the unlocking motion?
Second, to accurately compute the angular displacement of the
wrist for each phase of the unlocking procedure, the adversary
needs to divide or segment the gyroscope time-series into
individual phases. We address these issues by developing an
unlocking activity recognition technique (Section IV-C), and
a segmentation technique (Section IV-D).
C. Unlocking Activity Recognition
Before attempting to infer combinations from the target
user’s wrist motions, one critical challenge for the adversary
is to precisely detect when the unlock event takes place.
In order to overcome this challenge, we design an offline
activity recognition technique to detect and record times-
tamps of unlocking operations on combination locks. Our
activity recognition technique does not require any additional
adversarial capabilities or resources as it employs only the
gyroscope data stream (specifically, the x-axis data) which
is already recorded by the adversary for the inference task.
While analyzing characteristics of the time-series gyroscope
data during unlocking, we observed that the integrated angular
displacement increases on both positive and negative axis in
successive periods. This is because after rotating the dial
(clockwise or counter-clockwise) to an extent, users release
the dial, go back in reverse (counter-clockwise or clockwise,
respectively), again grab the dial, and continue entering the
remaining part of the combination key (clockwise or counter-
clockwise, respectively). We refer to one such clockwise-
counterclockwise (or vice-versa) motion during combination
key entry as a “spin”, which is primarily related to the
comfortable wrist rotation ability (or desire) of humans. Such
spin-ing is repeated multiple times during any combination
key entry, approximately every half a turn (pi) and over
a maximum duration of approximately 5 seconds. We can
observe this phenomenon in the sample gyroscope (x-axis)
time-series corresponding to a padlock unlocking operation
(Figure 3). We utilize the above observations in the design of
the following four features which will be employed by our
activity recognition technique:
• Positive Displacements (+α): Integration of positive x-axis
gyroscope samples.
• Negative Displacements (-α): Integration of negative x-axis
gyroscope samples.
• Summed Displacement (+α+ -α): Sum of integrated pos-
itive and negative x-axis samples.
• Total Displacement Magnitude (+α + |-α|): Sum of the
magnitudes of integrated positive and negative x-axis sam-
ples.
In order to confirm the above observations, we computed
the means and standard deviations of the above four features
over all the 5 second windows (maximum duration of a spin)
in the preliminary unlocking-related gyroscope data collected
earlier (Figure 2a). We observed that the mean values of
the magnitudes of +α and -α are approximately similar in a
spin, the mean value of the total displacement magnitude is
approximately double of both +α and -α, and the mean value
of the summed displacement is close to zero. We employ these
5learned mean and standard deviation values to form a decision-
tree for detecting spins. During the activity recognition, the
above four features are recursively computed for every 5
second window, and the decision-tree classifies a window
as a spin if all the four features are within one standard
deviation of the learned means. In the case of padlock, if 5
(minimum number of spins observed for the shortest padlock
combination: 39-0-39) or more spins are observed within
a short time window (empirically determined based on the
maximum unlocking time observed in data) an unlocking
activity is recognized. A similar strategy could be used to
recognize unlocking operation on a safe.
D. Segmentation
Segmentation of the time-series gyroscope data representing
the entire combination key input into data corresponding to
individual phases or transitions (three for the padlock and four
for the safe) will simplify the overall design of the inference
framework. This is because the combination inference problem
can then be reduced to the problem of independently inferring
the combination number corresponding to each segmented
transition. In order to design a reliable segmentation technique,
we leverage on the observation from our earlier experiments
that humans tend to slow down when they approach a number
in their combination key. We believe that this phenomenon is
due to the cognitive processing of the human brain governing
the physiological action of stopping at a particular number,
which causes the subjects to slow down when approaching the
intended number in their combination key or risk overshooting
it (and thus having to restart the entire key entry process). We
can observe this phenomenon in the time-series gyroscope data
corresponding to the unlocking operation of the Master Lock
1500T padlock by one of the subjects, where we can clearly
see (Figure 3) the sharp decreases in the angular velocity
(red line) when approaching the combination key number near
the end of each phase. In order to automate the process of
segmentation, we design an algorithm to detect the relative
decrease in angular velocity, and use the peaks (representing
slowest movement) to segment the entire time-series. The
algorithm first computes the absolute values of all samples
in the gyroscope time-series data, inverts, and then amplifies
the time-series by a factor of 10 (for better visualization).
Then, on the resultant time-series, a Gaussian filter with a
moving window [17] of 15 samples (learned empirically, at
200 Hz sampling frequency) is applied. Finally, the algorithm
performs a search for top-2 global peaks in the resultant time-
series, which represents approximate timestamps for the first
and second number of the combination key, in chronological
order. The blue (top) line in Figure 3 is an example of the
visualized output of our segmentation algorithm, showing the
detected peaks and resulting segmentation timestamps. Our
algorithm also works on gyroscope data from the safe, using
top-3 peaks.
V. DETERMINISTIC ATTACK FRAMEWORK
We develop two learning-based inference frameworks to
infer numbers of the combination key inputted on the lock’s
A
N
G
U
L
A
R
 D
IS
P
L
A
C
E
M
E
N
T
S
 (
R
A
D
/S
)
Output of the Segmentation Algorithm
Raw Gyroscope Time-Series Data
TIME-SERIES (200 Hz)
1st Number 
Timestamp
Starting 
Timestamp
2nd Number 
Timestamp
3rd Number 
Timestamp
Fig. 3: Segmentation using a Gaussian filter.
dial from the segmented smartwatch gyroscope data. We first
outline a deterministic framework which outputs a single
inferred combination key from the segmented time-series
gyroscope input.
A. Padlock Attack Model
Assuming that the starting point s on the padlock’s dial is
fixed/known (say, to be 0), we can define Φ1 = {81, 82.., 120},
Φ2 = {41, 42.., 80} and Φ3 = {1, 2.., 40} as the sets of
possible padlock transitions in phase 1, phase 2 and phase
3 of the unlocking procedure, respectively. Now for a given
3-number combination key k = 〈a, b, c〉 of the Master Lock
1500T padlock, where a, b, c ∈ {0, 1.., 39}, let θsak ∈ Φ1,
θabk ∈ Φ2 and θbck ∈ Φ3 be the actual transitions or number
of units traversed (on the lock’s dial) between consecutive
numbers of the combination key k, i.e., θsak , θ
ab
k and θ
bc
k are
the number of units traversed between 0 and a, between a
and b, and between b and c, respectively. Let αsak , α
ab
k and
αbck denote the corresponding angular displacements of the
target user’s wrist (ignoring the direction or sign) calculated
from the segmented smartwatch gyroscope data. The inference
framework comprises of a training phase and an attack phase.
During the training phase, the adversary collects training data
(from a set of human participants) comprising of a set of θ
and corresponding α values for a sample set of combinations
covering all possible transitions. As indicated by our pre-
liminary results (Figure 2a), the relationship between angular
displacements of the wrist and transitions on the lock’s dial can
be approximated by a linear function. Thus, the adversary can
use the training data to learn such a linear function α = mθ+n
that best fits all (θ, α) points in each of the [s, a], [a, b] and
[b, c] transition ranges of the training data. The adversary can
employ a least squares [53] technique in order to learn such a
linear function (Figure 2b). Then during the attack phase, for
an unknown combination key kˆ = 〈aˆ, bˆ, cˆ〉, the adversary first
segments the gyroscope data and computes the corresponding
angular displacements αsaˆ
kˆ
, αaˆbˆ
kˆ
and αbˆcˆ
kˆ
. The adversary’s goal
then is to determine a combination k′, as an inference of kˆ, by
first approximating or estimating the θsaˆ
kˆ
∈ Φ1, θaˆbˆkˆ ∈ Φ2 and
θbˆcˆ
kˆ
∈ Φ3 values from the corresponding angular displacements
(αsaˆ
kˆ
, αaˆbˆ
kˆ
and αbˆcˆ
kˆ
, respectively). Let these approximations of
θsaˆ
kˆ
, θaˆbˆ
kˆ
and θbˆcˆ
kˆ
be denoted as θ¯saˆ, θ¯aˆbˆ and θ¯bˆcˆ, respectively.
6In order to accomplish this, the adversary employs the linear
function (α = mθ + n) learned earlier. Once the transition in
each phase has been estimated, k′ can be computed as:
k′ = 〈((−θ¯saˆ + s) mod 40),
((θ¯aˆbˆ + (−θ¯saˆ + s)) mod 40),
((−θ¯bˆcˆ + (θ¯aˆbˆ + (−θ¯saˆ + s))) mod 40)〉
(1)
B. Safe Attack Model
Similar to the padlock, we can define
Ψ1 = {401, 402.., 500}, Ψ2 = {201, 202.., 300},
Ψ3 = {101, 102.., 200} and Ψ4 = {1, 2.., 100} as the
sets of possible safe transitions in phase 1, phase 2, phase
3 and phase 4 of the safe unlocking procedure, respectively.
For a given 4-number safe combination k = 〈a, b, c, d〉, where
a, b, c, d ∈ {0, 1.., 99}, let θsak ∈ Ψ1, θabk ∈ Ψ2, θbck ∈ Ψ3
and θcdk ∈ Ψ4 be the actual transitions between consecutive
numbers of the combination key k. Also, let αsak , α
ab
k , α
bc
k
and αcdk denote the corresponding angular displacements
of the target user’s wrist (ignoring the direction) calculated
from the segmented smartwatch gyroscope data. Similar to
the padlock case, the adversary collects training data (from
a set of human participants) comprising of a set of θ and
corresponding α values for a sample set of combinations
covering all possible transitions, and uses it to learn a linear
function (of the form of α = pθ + q) by employing a least
squares [53] technique. Then during the attack phase, for an
unknown combination key kˆ = 〈aˆ, bˆ, cˆ, dˆ〉, the adversary first
segments the time-series gyroscope data and computes the
corresponding angular displacements αsaˆ
kˆ
, αaˆbˆ
kˆ
, αbˆcˆ
kˆ
and αcˆdˆ
kˆ
.
The adversary’s goal then is to determine a combination k′ as
an inference of kˆ by first estimating the θsaˆ
kˆ
∈ Ψ1, θaˆbˆkˆ ∈ Ψ2,
θbˆcˆ
kˆ
∈ Ψ3 and θcˆdˆkˆ ∈ Ψ4 values from the corresponding
angular displacements. In order to accomplish this, the
adversary employs the linear function (α = pθ + q) learned
earlier. Then the adversary computes k′ as:
k′ = 〈((θ¯saˆ + s) mod 100),
((−θ¯aˆbˆ + (θ¯saˆ + s)) mod 100),
((θ¯bˆcˆ + (−θ¯aˆbˆ + (θ¯saˆ + s))) mod 100),
((−θ¯cˆdˆ + (θ¯bˆcˆ + (−θ¯aˆbˆ + (θ¯saˆ + s)))) mod 100)〉
(2)
VI. PROBABILISTIC ATTACK FRAMEWORK
One shortcoming of the deterministic framework is that it
outputs only a single prediction, which if incorrect, is not very
useful to the adversary. A ranked list of predictions (“close”
to the actual combination) would be useful in reducing the
search space and more desirable, especially if the combination
predicted by the deterministic framework is incorrect. Empir-
ical analysis of our deterministic framework (Section VII-B)
shows that the inference error (for each inferred number in
the combination) has a low standard deviation, which suggests
that numbers neighboring an incorrect inference have a higher
likelihood of being part of the real combination key than
numbers farther away. We use this observation in the design
of our probabilistic framework.
A. Ranking of Padlock Key Predictions
The goal of the probabilistic framework is to create an
ordered list of inferred combinations, ranked based on the
probability of a combination being the actual combination.
We achieve this objective by giving priority to transitions
closer to θ¯saˆ, θ¯aˆbˆ and θ¯bˆcˆ (calculated by the deterministic
model), than transitions further away from it. This is done
by assigning probabilities to all possible transitions in Φ1,
Φ2 and Φ3 using three normal distributions N (θ¯saˆ, σ2saˆ),
N (θ¯aˆbˆ, σ2
aˆbˆ
) and N (θ¯bˆcˆ, σ2
bˆcˆ
), respectively. The means and
standard deviations of these distributions are learned from the
deterministic model presented in Section V-A. Specifically, we
calculate probabilities P (X|αsaˆ
kˆ
) ∼ N (θ¯saˆ, σ2saˆ) for all possi-
ble transitions X ∈ Φ1 being the actual transition performed in
phase 1, P (Y |αaˆbˆ
kˆ
) ∼ N (θ¯aˆbˆ, σ2
aˆbˆ
) for all possible transitions
Y ∈ Φ2 being the actual transition performed in phase 2, and
P (Z|αbˆcˆ
kˆ
) ∼ N (θ¯bˆcˆ, σ2
bˆcˆ
) for all possible transitions Z ∈ Φ3
being the actual transition performed in phase 3.
Once P (X|αsaˆ
kˆ
), P (Y |αaˆbˆ
kˆ
) and P (Z|αbˆcˆ
kˆ
) for all possible
transitions X , Y and Z are computed, the probability P (kˆ =
k′) of each of the 64K possible combination keys k′ being
the actual combination kˆ entered by the target user can be
determined as:
P (kˆ = k′) = P (X|αsaˆkˆ )P (Y |αaˆbˆkˆ )P (Z|αbˆcˆkˆ ); ∀(X,Y, Z) (3)
Where k′ can be obtained by substituting θ¯saˆ, θ¯aˆbˆ and θ¯bˆcˆ
with X , Y and Z in Equation 1, respectively. All the 64K
combinations k′ can then be ordered or ranked using P (kˆ =
k′), with a higher value of P (kˆ = k′) indicating that k′ is
more likely to be the actual combination kˆ. Such a ranked list
of combinations, denoted as K¯, provides the adversary with
a targeted search space to carry out the inference attack. If
the actual combination key kˆ lies in the top-r of K¯, then the
attack framework is said to succeed after r attempts in the
worst-case. The adversary would obviously like r to be as
small as possible.
B. Ranking of Safe Key Predictions
The above probabilistic model for the padlock can be
trivially extended to the safe. This is done by calculating
probabilities P (W |αsaˆ
kˆ
);∀W ∈ Ψ1, P (X|αaˆbˆkˆ );∀X ∈ Ψ2,
P (Y |αbˆcˆ
kˆ
);∀Y ∈ Ψ3 and P (Z|αcˆdˆkˆ );∀Z ∈ Ψ4 using nor-
mal distributions N (θ¯saˆ, σ2saˆ), N (θ¯aˆbˆ, σ2aˆbˆ), N (θ¯bˆcˆ, σ2bˆcˆ) and
N (θ¯cˆdˆ, σ2
cˆdˆ
), respectively. Then, the probability P (kˆ = k′) of
each of the 1004 possible combination keys k′ being the actual
combination kˆ entered by the target user can be determined
as:
P (kˆ = k′) = P (W |αsaˆkˆ )P (X|αaˆbˆkˆ )P (Y |αbˆcˆkˆ )P (Z|αcˆdˆkˆ ) (4)
Where k′ can be obtained by substituting θ¯saˆ, θ¯aˆbˆ, θ¯bˆcˆ and θ¯cˆdˆ
with W , X , Y and Z in Equation 2, respectively. All 1004
combinations k′ can then be similarly ranked in a decreasing
order using P (kˆ = k′).
7C. Search Space Reduction
Although the theoretical combination space for both the
Master Lock 1500T and the First Alert 2087F-BD are large
enough to make manual brute-force attacks impractical, the
padlock has some well-known design limitations. In practice,
only a set of 4000 keys are used in the production design
of Master Lock, as pointed out in a LifeHacker article [1].
Accordingly, after studying how our probabilistic attack model
performs on the entire 403 key space, we also analyze how
our attack can improve predictions within the already reduced
space of |K¯|= 4000 combinations. We are not aware of similar
limitations in the First Alert safe.
VII. EVALUATION
We conduct thorough empirical evaluations of the proposed
inference frameworks in order to assess their performance
under realistic lock operation scenarios. Our evaluation results
are outlined next.
A. Experimental Setup
We evaluate the proposed inference frameworks by means
of smartwatch gyroscope data collected from a set of human
subject participants who performed unlocking operations on
the Master Lock 1500T padlock and the First Alert 2087F-
BD safe with the watch-wearing hand. For our experiments,
we employed a Samsung Gear Live smartwatch which runs
Android Wear 1.5 mobile OS and is equipped with an In-
venSense MP92M 9-axis Gyro + Accelerometer + Compass
sensor. The smartwatch’s gyroscope sensor was sampled at
200 Hz, and the samples were transmitted over a Bluetooth
connection to a paired Android smartphone (specifically, a
Samsung I9500 Galaxy S4). The smartphone recorded the
received sensor data stream into labeled files, which were later
used for training and validation (testing). All preprocessing,
training and testing were performed on a server equipped
with dual Intel Xeon L5640 processors and 64 GB of RAM.
During the data collection, participants are clearly explained
the unlocking procedure for each lock. The locks are placed on
a flat table and participants sit on a chair across the table while
unlocking. For the first part of our evaluation (sections VII-B
and VII-C), we collect and use data from the participants’ right
hand (i.e., the right hand was used to unlock) in a controlled
setting. In this setting, each combination is dictated one at
a time to the participants who would then correctly enter
it on the lock. Our only objective for collecting unlocking-
related motion data from participants was to employ it for
a realistic evaluation of the proposed inference frameworks.
Our data collection procedure posed no safety or ethical
risks to participants, and no private or personally identifiable
information (including, combinations of personal locks/safes)
was collected from participants. This study is approved by our
institution’s IRB.
B. Deterministic Attack Framework Results
We evaluate the performance of the deterministic framework
by measuring the standard deviations of the inferred transi-
tions θ¯ij from the corresponding ground-truths θij for each
phase of the unlocking operation. We specifically evaluated
three different inference strategies: i) inferring transitions
(+θ¯ij) solely using positive displacements (+αij), ii) inferring
transitions (-θ¯ij) solely using negative displacements (-αij),
and iii) averaging inferences (
+θ¯ij+-θ¯ij
2 ) obtained individually
using positive and negative displacements. Our objective is to
determine if transition inference using any one of the above
displacement parameter is better than the other.
1) Results for Padlock: The training dataset for the Master
Lock 1500T padlock is composed of data collected from 3
participants (who are the authors, acting as the adversary).
Each participant entered 40 different 3-digit combinations,
covering all of the 120 possible transitions (40 in each of
Φ1, Φ2 and Φ3). This data entry was repeated 3 times by
each participant, resulting in a total of 9 complete datasets
which is used for training the deterministic attack model.
The testing dataset was collected later from a different set of
10 participants (non-authors)2. Each of these test participants
entered 4 different 3-digit combinations covering 12 of the
120 possible transitions (4 in each of Φ1, Φ2 and Φ3), and
repeated the data entry 3 times. The combination of data
collected from all the 10 participants resulted in 3 complete
test datasets covering all the 120 possible transitions. The data
collection task is a non-trivial and time-consuming process
due to the high cognitive workload associated with entering
new and previously unknown combinations which resulted
in a significant number of input errors by the participants.
All input errors during data-collection were closely monitored
and eliminated from the final datasets, and participants were
asked to re-enter combinations on which errors occurred. We
took utmost care to ensure that our test dataset is complete
(covering all transitions) and reasonably heterogeneous (from
10 different participants) to avoid any bias in the evaluation
results. The evaluation results, outlined next, are using the
averaged prediction over all the 3 test datasets.
Table I shows the linear least-squares fittings for αsa, αab
and αbc, learned from the 9 training sets. These learned linear
least-squares fitting parameters (m and n) are then used within
the deterministic framework to infer the 120 unique transitions
in the test dataset. Figure 4a (Right Hand results) shows the
standard deviations in inference errors for the inferred transi-
tions in phase 1 (θ¯sa), in phase 2 (θ¯ab) and in phase 3 (θ¯bc).
We can see that the inference averaging method (
+θ¯ij+-θ¯ij
2 )
resulted in lowest error for the inference of transitions in
phase 1 (specifically, 12.27 units) and phase 2 (8.49 units),
respectively. However, inference using negative displacement
(-αbc) resulted in the lowest error in phase 3 (4.82 units). We
can also see that the inference of shorter transitions are more
accurate than longer ones. This observation is intuitive and
could be attributed to the differences in the biomechanics of
the diarthrodial joints [36] of the test and training participants.
These joints play an important role during the unlocking
operation and the errors due to biomechanical differences
2The training dataset for all experiments were collected independently and
before the test participants were identified/recruited, which gives us the worst-
case results. However, an adversary could be more successful by personalizing
the training process for the user being targeted.
8TABLE I: Linear least-squares fittings for the padlock.
m (Slope) n (α-intercept)
+αsa (81-120): 0.0836 0.3272
-αsa (81-120): -0.1269 0.3714
+αab (41-80): 0.0854 0.9360
-αab (41-80): -0.1163 0.3301
+αbc (1-40): 0.0737 2.0387
-αbc (1-40): -0.1173 0.0061
TABLE II: Linear least-squares fittings for the safe.
p (Slope) q (α-intercept)
+αsa (401-500): 0.0153 19.5492
-αsa (401-500): -0.0266 -8.8471
+αab (201-300): 0.0010 7.9046
-αab (201-300): -0.0386 -2.3798
+αbc (101-200): 0.0170 3.6319
-αbc (101-200): -0.0460 0.4906
+αcd(1-100): 0.0305 1.7663
-αcd (1-100): -0.0483 -0.1058
could add up for longer transitions, thus making their inference
more error-prone.
2) Results for Safe: The training dataset for the First Alert
2087F-BD safe is composed of data collected from 3 par-
ticipants (who are the authors). Each participant entered 100
different 4-digit combinations, covering all of the 400 possible
transitions (100 in each of Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4), which resulted
in 3 complete training datasets. Testing dataset was collected
later from a set of 10 different participants (non-authors),
where each participant entered 2 different 4-digit combinations
covering 8 of the 400 possible transitions (2 in each of the
transition sets {405, 410, 415, ...500}, {205, 210, 215, ...300},
{105, 110, 115, ...200} and {5, 10, 15, ...100}). Each partic-
ipant repeated entering each combination 3 times, which
resulted in 3 partially complete test datasets of 80 evenly
distributed transitions. Due to a slightly more complex and
longer unlocking procedure of the safe (compared to the
padlock), we observed a larger number of participant errors
during combination entry. As before, all input errors were
closely monitored and removed from the final datasets. Due
to a large combination space, in addition to the more complex
unlocking procedure, we restricted ourselves to only partial
test datasets for the safe. However, we made sure that the test
dataset is uniform in terms of the distribution of the various
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Fig. 4: Standard deviations in inference error for (a) – three
padlock phases, and (b) – four safe phases.
transitions and the participants that recorded those transitions
to avoid any bias in the evaluation results. The evaluation
results, outlined next, are using the averaged prediction over
all the 3 test datasets.
Table II shows the linear least-squares fittings for αsa, αab,
αbc and αcd, learned from the 3 training sets. These learned
linear least-squares fitting parameters (p and q) are then used to
infer the 80 unique transitions in the test datasets. The standard
deviations in inference errors for the inferred transitions in
phase 1 (θ¯sa), in phase 2 (θ¯ab), in phase 3 (θ¯bc) and in phase
4 (θ¯cd) are outlined in Figure 4b (Samsung Gear Live results).
We can see that the inference averaging method resulted in
the lowest error for the inference of transitions in phase 1
(specifically, 22.99 units), while inference using positive dis-
placement (+αab) resulted in the lowest error for the inference
of transitions in phase 2 (17.86 units). For transitions in phase
3 and phase 4, inference using the corresponding negative
displacements (i.e., -αbc and -αcd) resulted in lowest errors
(8.66 and 7.23 units, respectively). Similar to the padlock case,
we can observe that inference of shorter transitions in safe
combinations are more accurate. Moreover, we also observe
that the standard deviations of inference errors for the safe
are relatively higher compared to the padlock. We believe that
this is due to the higher concentration of numbers on the safe’s
lock dial, compared to the padlock’s dial, for the same angular
displacement.
C. Probabilistic Attack Framework Results
We evaluate the performance of the probabilistic attack
model by evaluating the overall success probability of test
combination keys being present in the top-r of their corre-
sponding ranked inferred combination sets.
1) Padlock Key Predictions (64K): We first evaluate the
success probability of finding an entire padlock test combi-
nation key within the top-r of the corresponding set of 64K
candidate keys, ranked using the probabilistic model. The 64K
unique test combinations were obtained by combination of Φ1,
Φ2 and Φ3 datasets. In this case, rather than using all the
three methods for the inference of the individual transitions
of the test combination, i.e., inference using only positive
displacements, only negative displacements, and averaging
individual inferences, we optimize the overall combination
inference by selecting the inference method with the low-
est error in each phase, for inferring transitions of the test
combination key in that phase. Thus for all the 64K test
padlock combinations, the first two phases were inferred
using inference averaging method, and the third phase using
negative displacements. The value of r was increased from
50 to 64,000 in varying steps. Figure 5a shows the success
probability of finding a test combination within the top-r of
the corresponding probabilistically ranked (using Equation 3)
set of candidate keys. 688 test combinations (out of a total
of 64K test combinations) were found in the top-50 of their
corresponding ranked inferred combination set, which equates
to a 1.07% overall probability of success. Compared to this,
the probability of correctly picking a test combination after 50
random guesses is only 0.078%. This implies that for r = 50
9the proposed probabilistic model achieves an improvement by
a factor of 13.76 over random guessing. Despite the low overall
success probability, the above results are indicative of the fact
that certain combinations (688 test combinations) are easier
to infer than others. Figure 5d show similar improvements
factors for all other top-r cases. These results indicate that an
adversary can significantly reduce the search space, and still
have high probability of success. As a result, the cumulative
probability of success using the probabilistic model is much
higher with ‘limited’ number of trials, compared to random
guessing or the deterministic attack.
2) Padlock Key Predictions (4K): We again evaluate the
success probability of finding an entire test combination key
within the top-r of the corresponding set of candidate keys
ranked using the probabilistic model, but this time using
the only the 4K implemented padlock combinations (outlined
in Section VI-C) as test combinations. Similar to the 64K
analysis, for all the 4K test padlock combinations, the first
two phases were inferred using inference averaging method,
and the third phase using negative displacements. The value
of r was increased from 10 to 4,000 in varying steps. Figure
5b shows the success probability of finding a test combination
within the top-r of the corresponding probabilistically ranked
(using Equation 3) set of candidate keys. 235 test combinations
(out of a total of 4K test combinations) were found in the
top-10 of their corresponding ranked inferred combination
set, which equates to a 5.87% overall probability of success.
Compared to this, the probability of correctly picking a
test combination (among all the implemented keys) after 10
random guesses is only 0.25%. This implies that for r = 10
the proposed probabilistic model achieves an improvement
by a factor of 23.5 over random guessing. Figure 5e show
similar improvements factors for all other top-r cases. These
results indicate that an adversary can significantly reduce
the combination search space by leveraging on both known
mechanical flaws and eavesdropped wrist-movements.
3) Safe Key Predictions (160K): We next evaluate the
success probability of finding an entire test combination
key within the top-r of the corresponding set of candidate
keys ranked using the probabilistic model. For this analysis,
we test 160K safe combinations k = 〈a, b, c, d〉 distributed
evenly across the entire 1004 combination space (θsaˆ ∈
{405, 410, 415, ...500}, θaˆbˆ ∈ {205, 210, 215, ...300}, θaˆbˆ ∈
{105, 110, 115, ...200} and θaˆbˆ ∈ {5, 10, 15, ...100}). The
160K unique test combinations were obtained by combination
of Ψ1, Ψ2, Ψ3 and Ψ4 datasets. Similar to padlock key
predictions, we optimize the overall combination inference by
selecting the inference method with the lowest error in each
phase, for inferring transitions of the test combination key in
that phase. Thus for all the 160K test safe combinations, the
first phase was inferred using inference averaging method, the
second phase was inferred using positive displacements, and
the last two phases using negative displacements. The value of
r was increased from 100 to 160,000 in varying steps. It should
be noted that in the case of the safe, we only probabilistically
rank the (evenly distributed) 160K keys appearing in the test
set rather than the entire safe combination space of 1004. This
is primarily due to the computational challenge associated with
688 1436
3181
8422
14585
34914
45631
56253
64000
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
T
O
P
 5
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
T
O
P
 2
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 2
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 6
4
0
0
0
A
X
IS
 T
IT
L
E
Using            a
1
0.875
0.75
0.625
.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
P
R
O
B
A
B
IL
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
U
C
C
E
S
S
(+θsa + -θsa)/2, (+θab + -θab)/2, -αbc
Number of Successful 
Predictions Out of 
64,000 Test Keys
(a)
235
847
1339
1934
2861
3424
4000
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
T
O
P
 1
0
T
O
P
 5
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
T
O
P
 2
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
T
O
P
 4
0
0
0
A
X
IS
 T
IT
L
E
Using            a
Number of Successful 
Predictions Out of 
4,000 Test Keys
1
0.875
0.75
0.625
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
P
R
O
B
A
B
IL
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
U
C
C
E
S
S
(+θsa + -θsa)/2, (+θab + -θab)/2, -αbc
(b)
1142 5876
10434
31126
39576
67927
99370
160000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
T
O
P
 1
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
6
0
0
0
0
A
X
IS
 T
IT
L
E
Using            a
Number of Successful 
Predictions Out of 
160,000 Test Keys
6
2
5
0
0
3
1
2
5
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
0
3
1
2
5
0
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
0
0
3
1
2
5
0
0
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+θsa + -θsa)/2, +αab, -αbc, -αcd
1
0.875
0.75
0.625
0.5
0.375
0.25
0.125
P
R
O
B
A
B
IL
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
U
C
C
E
S
S
(c)
13.76 14.36
15.905
16.844
14.585
6.9828
4.5631
2.81265
1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
T
O
P
 5
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
T
O
P
 2
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 2
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 6
4
0
0
0
Using            a Poly. (Using            a)
S
U
C
C
E
S
S
 I
M
P
R
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
 F
A
C
T
O
R
 
C
O
M
P
A
R
E
D
 T
O
 R
A
N
D
O
M
 T
R
IA
L
S
(+θsa + -θsa)/2, (+θab + -θab)/2, -αbc
(d)
23.5
16.94
13.39
9.67
5.722
3.424
1
0
5
10
15
20
25
T
O
P
 1
0
T
O
P
 5
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
T
O
P
 2
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
T
O
P
 4
0
0
0
Using            a Poly. (Using            a)
S
U
C
C
E
S
S
 I
M
P
R
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
 F
A
C
T
O
R
 
C
O
M
P
A
R
E
D
 T
O
 R
A
N
D
O
M
 T
R
IA
L
S
(+θsa + -θsa)/2, (+θab + -θab)/2, -αbc
(e)
11.42 11.752
10.434
6.2252
3.9576
1.358540.9937 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
T
O
P
 1
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 5
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
0
0
0
0
0
T
O
P
 1
6
0
0
0
0
Using            a Poly. (Using            a)
6
2
5
0
0
3
1
2
5
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
0
3
1
2
5
0
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
0
0
3
1
2
5
0
0
0
0
6
2
5
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(+θsa + -θsa)/2, +αab, -αbc, -αcd
S
U
C
C
E
S
S
 I
M
P
R
O
V
E
M
E
N
T
 F
A
C
T
O
R
 
C
O
M
P
A
R
E
D
 T
O
 R
A
N
D
O
M
 T
R
IA
L
S
(f)
Fig. 5: (a) − Top-r success probabilities for inferred padlock combinations using 64K test combinations; (b) − Top-r success
probabilities for inferred padlock combinations using 4K test combinations; (c) − Top-r success probabilities for inferred safe
combinations using 160K test combinations; (d), (e), (f) − Success improvement factors compared to random trials, for the
padlock test set of 64K test combinations, padlock test set of 4K test combinations and safe test set of 160K test combinations,
respectively.
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computing probabilities for, and then ranking, 100 million
combination keys for each of the 160K test combinations,
which is an extremely time-consuming process. The adversary,
however, does not have a similar problem because the adver-
sary has to rank the entire combination space of 1004 for only
a few test keys, which is relatively easier to compute. Figure
5c shows the success probability of finding a test combination
within the top-r of the corresponding probabilistically ranked
set of candidate keys. 5876 test combinations (out of a total
of 160K test combinations) were found in the top-500 of their
corresponding ranked inferred combination set, which equates
to a 3.67% overall probability of success. Compared to this, the
probability of correctly picking a test combination after 500
random guesses is only 0.31%. This implies that for r = 500
the proposed probabilistic model achieves an improvement by
a factor of 11.42 over random guessing. A straightforward
extrapolation of r (multiplying it with a factor of 54) puts
the value of r at 312500 for achieving similar improvement if
the entire combination space of 1004 combinations is ranked.
Readers should note that labels marked in red in Figure 5c are
extrapolated values of r. Figure 5f show similar improvements
factors for all other top-r cases. These results indicate that the
proposed framework can achieve significant reduction of the
combination search space for the safe as well.
D. Cross-Device Performance
So far we have evaluated our inference frameworks in
a same-device setting where the same smartwatch hardware
(Samsung Gear Live smartwatch with an InvenSense MP92M
sensor) was used for collecting both the training and testing
datasets. However in a practical setting, an adversary may be
unaware of, or may not possess, the precise wrist-wearable
hardware used by the target user. Thus, it is critical to assess
the performance of the inference frameworks when different
wrist-wearable hardwares are used for training and testing
(attack) purposes. In other words, a comparison of the earlier
evaluation results with results using test data from a different
smartwatch would tell us if the proposed inference frameworks
are inter-operable across different devices. For brevity, we ana-
lyze the cross-device performance of the inference frameworks
only for the First Alert 2087F-BD safe. For this, we collect the
same set of test data for the safe as detailed in Section VII-B2
by using a LG Watch Urbane smartwatch equipped with an on-
board InvenSense M651 6-axis Gyro + Accelerometer sensor
(sampled at 200 Hz) and running Android 2.0 mobile OS. We
then employ the linear function α = pθ+ q (Table II), trained
from the data collected with a Samsung Gear Live (as outlined
in section VII-B2).
A comparison of the standard deviations in inference error
(Figure 4b) does not show significant change in prediction
results we observed earlier. A pair-wise two-tailed t-test [55]
of all the values in both set of results, resulted in t = 0.11; p =
0.915. The small value of t indicates that there exists minor
difference between the two sets of results. However, due to
the high p value (which implies that our results have likely
occurred by chance), we cannot conclusively say that an
adversary can train the inference models using data from one
device and use these trained models to carry out inference
attacks on data from a different wrist-wearable device. That
being said, it is not difficult for an adversary to train a new
model according to the target user’s wrist-wearable device.
E. Cross-Hand Performance
All evaluations of our inference models so far have been
accomplished using training and testing datasets collected
from subjects who only used their right hand for the unlocking
operation. However in a practical setting, a target user may not
perform the unlocking operation with the same hand that the
adversary has trained its models on. Thus, it is important to
assess the performance of the proposed inference frameworks
when training and testing data corresponding to the unlocking
operation comes from different hands. In other words, we
would like to analyze if the proposed inference models trained
using unlocking data from one hand (say, right) can be used to
infer combinations entered using the other hand (say, left). For
this we collect the same test data for the padlock as detailed
in Section VII-B1, but this time the 10 participants wore the
Samsung Gear Live smartwatch on their left hand and entered
the test combinations on the padlock with their left hand. We
then employ the linear function α = mθ + n, trained earlier
using the right hand data (Table I), to infer transitions in each
phase using the deterministic model.
A comparison of the standard deviations in inference error
(Figure 4a) does not show significant change in prediction
results we observed earlier using same-hand predictions. A
pair-wise two-tailed t-test of all the values in both set of
results, resulted in t = 1.33; p = 0.219. The small value of t
along with a low p value indicates that the mean difference
between the two sets of results is not significant, with a
low probability that our results occurred by chance. We can
therefore conclude that an adversary can focus on training a
single model with either hand’s data, and use it on both left
and right handed targets. Nevertheless, it is not difficult for
an adversary to train two different models, one per hand.
F. Real-Life Detection and Prediction
Next, we evaluate the performance of our unlocking activity
recognition algorithm (Section IV-C) and inference framework
under a real-life setting. To facilitate a real-life experiment
with three new participants, we handed out a Samsung Gear
Live smartwatch, a paired smartphone and a padlock, for them
to take home. The watch was installed with our recording
application and the unlock activity recognition algorithm. We
collected x-axis gyroscope data for the duration of approxi-
mately 1 day, during which the participants were instructed
to perform at least three padlock unlock operations with a 3-
digit combination of their choice (among the 4K mechanically
valid combinations), at random intervals. Overall, our unlock
activity recognition algorithm yielded 100% recall and 80%
precision, with a total of 12 true positives, 3 false positives
and 0 false negative. Interestingly, the 3 false positives were
reportedly due to activities similar to padlock unlocking, such
as when washing hands after rotating a washer tap/faucet, and
while using a screw driver. Next, we evaluate the prediction
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accuracy of the secret combination entered by each participant
by using the last three instance of their unlocking gyroscope
time-series data, as extracted from the entire day’s data.
Applying the same inference model for ranking keys among
the 4K implement keys, used in Section VII-C2, the real key
entered by the three participants were ranked at 42, 85 and
112 (out of 4000). This demonstrates the extent to which the
proposed attacks can reduce the combination search space even
in uncontrolled real-life settings.
VIII. DISCUSSIONS
A. Characteristics of Inferred Combinations
Results of our deterministic attack model indicated that
shorter transitions can be more accurately inferred than longer
transitions. To see if this phenomenon carries over to full
combinations as well, we analyzed the length (in terms of
transition units) of the 235 padlock combinations (out of 4K)
that were successfully inferred within top-10 trials (Figure 5b).
The shortest padlock combination can be of 123 transition
units (81 + 41 + 1), where as the longest combination can be
of 240 transition units (120+80+40). On this scale, 91.06% of
the 235 padlock combinations that were successfully inferred
within top-10 trials, were shorter than 150 transition units.
Based on this observation, we can conclude that key combi-
nations that require less rotational displacement have better
inference probability, and users should avoid purchasing locks
preset with such combinations.
B. Limitations
Starting Point: Without a known starting point the adversary
will have to try all numbers on the dial as the starting point,
thereby significantly increasing the average number of trials it
would take to be successful. However, because the adversary
will require physical access to the lock in order to try predicted
keys, it is not unrealistic to assume that they can also learn or
preset the starting point. The starting point can be any number
on the dial; only the key inference functions (Equations 1 and
2) must be appropriately initialized according to that starting
point. Moreover, the learned least-squares (Tables I and II) are
not affected by a change in the starting point during the attack
phase.
Kinesiological Factors: Factors such as the grasping style,
hand size, and muscle strength have a significant effect on
the biomechanics of the diarthrodial joints of a target user
performing an unlocking operation. While we did not en-
counter any participant in our study with significantly different
unlocking styles, it is possible for an adversary to come
across a target whose unlocking style is significantly different.
However, a competent adversary may be able to train a variety
of models based on different kinesiological factors, and use
an appropriate model for each target. Further user study is
required to understand if unlocking styles can be classified in
to characteristically unique groups.
Affected Users: Our attack assumes that the user wears his/her
wrist-wearable on the hand used to unlock the padlock or
safe. This may not always be the case, causing the attack
to fail. While we did not find any statistics in the literature
to deduce the percentage of users who use the same hand
for both, according to an on-going online poll with about
5000 participants [2], approximately 38.23% of users prefer to
wear watches on their dominant hand. Assuming most users
use their dominant hand for unlocking padlocks and safes, a
significant number of users can be affected by the proposed
attack. Moreover, with the advent of fitness trackers (most of
which also have gyroscope sensors), users tend to wear their
watches and wrist-based fitness trackers on different hands.
Regardless of the exact statistics, we hope that this work will
create awareness of this threat.
Generalizability: The proposed attack frameworks can be
easily extended to work with any other rotation-based me-
chanical combination lock, with different length of combi-
nation keys and different sequence of key entry directions
(clockwise/counter-clockwise). But, according to the trends in
our evaluation results, it can be challenging to infer longer
combination keys (5 or more numbers) and on locks with
more concentrated dials (more numbers on the dial face),
with high accuracy. However, in a brief study of the most
popular consumer-grade padlocks and safes, we found that 5
or more number combination padlocks and safes are very rare
in the retail market (Table III). There are several consumer-
grade padlocks and safes available for purchase, from different
manufacturers and retailers. However, most of them employ
similar, if not identical, working mechanisms. In Table III,
we list the most popular products with rotation-based locks,
which are representative of its type. Similar locks produced
by different manufacturers are faced with the same level of
threat, unless the manufacture introduces additional design
changes. For example, a Hollon Home Safe 310D and the
First Alert 2087F-BD Safe, both have 4-number combinations
with 100 numbers on the dial, resulting in 1004 possible
combinations. However, many larger enterprise-grade safes
and vaults are equipped with larger dials which can translate
in to more perceptible gyroscope readings on the wrist. As
a result, a more accurate inference may be possible for locks
with significantly larger dials. The principles used in our attack
TABLE III: Popular padlocks and safes retailed by Amazon
and Walmart.
Product CombinationLength ↓
Numbers
on Dial
Mechanical
Limitations
Master Lock
1500iD
Speed Dial
Unlimited 4 7501 uniquestates [25]
First Alert
2087F-BD
Safe
4 100 Unknown
SentrySafe
SFW082CTB 3 100 Unknown
Master Lock
1500T 3 40
4000 used
combinations
Master Lock
Padlock
1588D
3 20 Unknown
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models can also be used to infer private activities pertaining
to other forms of rotary wrist movements, such as numbers
entered on a rotary telephone dial, driving trajectory on a
steering wheel, etc.
C. Mitigations
Users can take few preventive measures to avoid falling
victim to the proposed attack. A simple measure could be
to use the hand without any wrist-wearable for unlocking,
or to take off any wrist-wearables before unlocking. Users
could also inject noise in the data by shaking their hand
in between the unlock operation. More complex protection
mechanisms can include dynamic access control of zero-
permission sensors such as the gyroscope. As some of the
previous works suggested [15], [31], a dynamic access control
can take advantage of contextual information to automatically
cut-off sensor access when users are detected to be vulnerable.
A potential solution in this direction could be to use our
unlocking activity recognition algorithm (presented in Section
IV-C) in a real-time fashion, so as to disable the gyroscope
after the first few spins.
D. Other Attack Vectors
Padlock and safe combinations are also susceptible to other
forms of non-intrusive attacks, such as visual shoulder-surfing
when the target user is unlocking. Visual access to a lock’s dial
when the user is unlocking, can result in more precise key
inference than our wrist motion based inference framework.
However, there is high likelihood that the user will notice a
visual observer (human or camera), and shield their unlocking
activity. It may also be possible to use visual on the user
(instead of the lock) to perform timing based inference attacks
[19].
IX. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we presented a new motion-based attack to in-
fer mechanical lock combinations from smartwatch gyroscope
data. A comprehensive evaluation using a commercial padlock
and safe demonstrated that our framework can significantly
reduce the combination search space for an adversary. The
combination key search space can be further reduced in case
of the padlock by leveraging on mechanical design flaws. We
also observed that the performance of the proposed inference
frameworks do not significantly degrade when model training
and inference tasks are carried out using different smartwatch
hardwares or different unlocking hands. Finally, we also
demonstrated the efficacy of the proposed inference attack in
a real-life setting.
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APPENDIX
In an earlier version of this paper, we made an incorrect con-
clusion of the statistical significance of our results presented in
Sections VII-D and VII-E, related to cross-device and cross-
hand application of our attack models. A low p value indicates
that the result (t value) obtained is not by ‘chance’, and vice
versa. This version of the paper rectifies the conclusions made
based on the observed p values in Sections VII-D and VII-E.
